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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
THEODORE I. GEURTS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 
9281 
Brief of Appellant and Defendant 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
THEODORE I. GEURTS was elected City Commissioner 
of Salt Lake City in the 195 7 election. His term of office began 
on January 6, 1958, to run through January 4, 1962. 
On July 13, 1959, the Salt Lake County Grand Jury 
returned an indictment against Commissioner Geurts, charging 
him with the crime of official neglect and misconduct in office, 
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• in violation of Title 10, Chapter 6, Section 36, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953. The indictment contained six counts (R. 82). 
On the 22nd day of October, 1959, Judge Merrill Faux 
granted the motion of the defendant to quash counts Nos. 1, 
4, 5 and 6 of the indictment. The motion to quash was denied 
as to counts 2 and 3. On the 2nd day of November, 1959, the 
court ordered the District Attorney to furnish to the defendant 
a bill of particulars as to counts 2 and 3. This bill of particulars 
was never furnished (R. 82). 
On the 15th day of February, 1960, the District Attorney 
filed a civil action entitled ((State of Utah, plaintiff. vs. Theo-
dore I. Geurts, Defendant," which action was brought under 
the provisions of Title 77, Chapter 7, Sections 1 and 2, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, for the purpose of removing the 
defendant from office (R. 1, 2). The accusation was in three 
counts. Count 1 revived Count 1 of the indictment, which had 
theretofore been quashed by Judge Faux. Counts 2 and 3 of 
the accusation were almost identical in form with Counts 
2 and 3 of the indictment, which Counts were at the time of 
the accusation still standing against the defendant, but upon 
which counts no bill of particular had been filed. 
We will not at this time relate the several motions and 
orders in regard both to the criminal case and the civil case 
which preceded the trial of the civil case, although these mo-
tions and orders form the basis of some of the points relied 
upon by the defendant in this appeal. The substance of these 
preliminary proceedings will be discussed fully in connection 
with the points to which they are applicable. 
The civil case for the removal of the defendant from his 
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office proceeded to trial on the 2nd day of May, 1960, before 
the Honorable Ran Van Cott, Jr., sitting with a jury. At the 
close of the State's case Judge Van Cott granted the motion 
of the defendant to dismiss Count 1 on the ground that the 
evidence was insufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty (R. 276). 
After hearing all of the evidence the jury returned a verdict 
finding the defendant guilty on Count 2 and not guilty on 
Count 3 of the accusation (R. 58, 60). The defendant filed 
a motion for a new trial (R. 62), which was denied (R. 74). 
Subsequently the court entered an order removing the defendant 
from his office as city commissioner (R. 70). This appeal is 
taken from such order of removal. 
THE EVIDENCE 
Count 1 
Mr. J. W. Reed, a licensed real estate broker in Salt Lake 
City, had had business dealings with Commissioner Geurts 
and his family prior to the time that Mr. Geurts was elected 
to the City Commission (R. 224). Early in January, 1959, 
Mr. Reed approached Commissioner Geurts in an attempt to 
sell the Commissioner and his brothers a piece of property in 
northwest Salt Lake City belonging to some people named 
Langford. Commissioner Geurts took the details in regard 
to the Langford property and informed Mr. Reed that he would 
discuss it with his brothers to see whether or not they would 
be interested in the purchase (R. 217). During this conver-
sation Mr. Reed asked Commissioner Geurts whether or not 
the city might be interested in some property in the vicinity 
of the Rose Park Golf Course (R. 228). Commissioner 
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Geurts informed Mr. Reed that he, Commissioner Geurts, 
had nothing to do with the purchase of property for the golf 
course (R. 218). City golf courses were under the jurisdiction 
of City Parks Department, which was administered by 
Commissioner L. C. Romney. Commissioner Geurts informed 
Reed that if he wished to attempt to sell the city any property 
for this purpose, negotiations ·would have to be carried on 
with Comrnissioner Romney. There were no further meetings 
or conversations between Commissioner Geurts and Mr. Reed 
until May 11, 1959 (R. 229). 
Reed thereafter made contact with the City Parks Depart-
ment and did sell to the City a tract of land belonging to the 
estate of a man named Hansen (R. 219) . The purchase of 
this land was handled by the Parks Department in the ordinary 
course of business. It came before the City Comnussion as 
a whole, and the purchase was approved by all of the Com-
missioners, including Commissioner Geurts, on April 30, 1959. 
Commissioner Geurts' sole connection with this deal was in 
voting to purchase the property (R. 230). He did not contact 
any other commissioner to urge the purchase, nor did he speak 
in favor of the purchase (R. 140). 
On May 11, 1959, Mr. Reed came to the office of Com-
missioner Geurts, and stated that he wished to make a campaign 
contribution to the Commissioner. He did make the Commis-
sioner a check in the amount of $119.00 (R. 221). Com-
missioner Geurts then took this check to a subordinate and 
asked him to cash the check at the City Treasurer's office 
(R. 234). Mr. Geurts then deposited this cash in his own 
account. In his testimony Mr. Reed was not very clear as to 
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why the amount of this check given to Mr. Geurts approxi-
mated 10% of the real estate commission which he had received 
on the sale of the Hansen property to the City. He was, how-
ever, very definite in his statement to the effect that he had 
never mentioned a payment, campaign contribution or other-
wise, to Mr. Geurts until after the deal was entirely consum-
mated (R. 230). 
At the close of his successful campaign for the City Com-
missionership, Commissioner Geurts' campaign committee had 
a number of unpaid bills. After these bills had remained 
unpaid for a period of time Mr. Geurts paid them himself 
from his own bank account. He reimbursed himself whenever 
contributions were made thereafter (R. 238). 
On the basis of the evidence thus introduced, the court, 
at the conclusion of the State's evidence, granted a motion 
dismissing Count 1. 
Count 2 
During the Spring months of 1959, a number of small 
trees and shrubs were taken from the City Cemetery to the 
home of Commissioner Geurts and to the home of his son-
in-la Vl. The shrubs and trees thus taken consisted of four 
arborvitae bushes, three small spruce trees, and two bridal 
wreath plants (R. 298). The shrubs and trees in question 
were not the property of Salt Lake City. They belonged to 
individuals from whose cemetery lots they had been removed 
in the course of the preparation of a gravesite (R. 286). By 
long time custom of the City Cemetery, whenever it \vas neces-
sary to remove a tree or a shrub incident to the preparation 
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of a grave, the owner was notified. If he wanted the tree or 
shrub it was turned over to him. If he did not want such 
shrub or tree they were given away to anyone that desired 
the1n, or in those cases where no one desired them they were 
hauled directly to the city dump, if there was a large number 
available at one time, or were placed on a dump in the city 
cemetery until a sufficient number was accumulated, at which 
time they would be hauled to the dump in a large truck (R. 
287). The uncontradicted testimony of the city cemetery 
e1nployees was that it required less cemetery force labor to 
drop these shrubs and trees off at Commissioner Geurts' home 
than it would to haul them all the way to the dump (R. 288). 
In each instance except one, Commissioner Geurts or his son-
in-law had prepared a hole for the planting of the tree or 
shrub, and the cemetery employees merely dropped the item 
ofi near the house (R. 190). On one occasion, however, due 
to a misunderstanding, the city cemetery employees did plant 
two arborvitae trees, and in doing so had to expand the planting 
hole already dug by Commissioner Geurts, but which proved 
too small to receive the tree (R. 207). There was also testi-
mony to the effect that on one occasion when a truck was on 
the way to the city dump and dropped a tree or a shrub at 
Commissioner Geurts' home on the way to the dump, Com-
missioner Geurts ordered the city employees to load onto 
the truck a pile of trash which had been collected from the 
Church farm which adjoined Commissioner Geurts' home 
(R. 206). The evidence, however '\vas that if such hauling 
had not been done by the city cemetery truck, it would have 
been done without charge on request by a truck from the 
City Street Department, in accordance with the policy of 
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the City Street Department to render such service to all citi-
zens (R. 278). The only evidence of any city property actually 
received by Commissioner Geurts was some three yards of 
top soil which was placed on the roots of the trees in transit 
to his home in order to keep them from drying out. The jury 
found Commissioner Geurts guilty on this count. 
Count 3 
In the Fall of 1958 Commissioner Geurts had been ap-
proached by the City Attorney and also by an official from the 
City Court with a request that a pay raise be granted to certain 
girls doing legal stenographic work. The evidence in the case 
is clear that these girls \\rere receiving somewhat less than the 
going pay for legal secretaries in Salt Lake City (R. 159) . 
Commissioner Geurts informed these department heads that 
he felt the girls shoudl have a raise, but that no money was 
available until after the first of January of 1959 (R. 152-154). 
He promised a raise effective as of that time. Shortly after 
the first of January this matter was again called to Mr. Geurts' 
attention. In the meantime, however, there was before the 
State Legislature a bill which would provide for a sales tax 
for the benefit of city governments. The City Commissioners 
had informally decided among themselves that no pay raises 
would be granted during the session of the Legislature. Com-
missioner Geurts agreed to recommend the girls in question 
for a pay raise immediaely following the session of the Legis-
lature and in the interim to grant them overtime checks for 
time not actually worked to bring their pay up to the level 
on which it would be after the raises were granted. This was 
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done (R. 165). Three girls received approximately $7.50 a 
week extra for a period of some six weeks. The jury found 
Commissioner Geurts not guilty of malfeasance for this action. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
The defendant relies upon the following listed points as 
a basis for seeking a reversal of judgment of the court below. 
These points are not here listed chronologically according to 
the time of the occurrence of the alleged errors, but are grouped 
for listing and discussion according to subject matter: 
1. The court erred in denying the defendant's motion to 
dismiss the accusation on the grounds and for the reason that 
Title 77, Chapter 7, Sections 1 and 2, Utah Code Annotated 
195 3 is so vague, indefinite and uncertain as to be in violation 
of Section 7, Article I of the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
2. The court erred in instructing the jury as to the elements 
of the offense of malfeasance in office. 
3. The court erred in denying the defendant's motion to 
dismission Count No. 1 of the accusation. 
4. The court erred in denying the defendant the right to 
take the deposition of witnesses prior to the trial, or in the 
alternative, the right to have a preliminary hearing. 
5. The court erred in denying the defendant's motion 
for a n1istrial as to Counts 2 and 3, made after the dismissal 
of Count 1, and also in denying the motion for a new trial. 
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6. The court erred in denying the challenge for cause 
to the Juror Ray H. Wilson. 
7. The court erred in denying the defendant's motion for 
a new trial on the grounds that the Jurors Ikeda and Jensen 
had answered falsely to certain voir dire questions, which false 
answers had prevented the defendant from taking a challenge 
for cause or from intelligently exercising his peremptory 
challenges. 
8. The court erred in overruling the defendant's objections 
to questions on cross-examination asked by the District At-
torney of the defendant's character witness Smith. 
9. The court erred in denying the defendant's motion 
in arrest of judgment made on the grounds that Chapter 7, 
Section 77, Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, has been super-
seded by Rule 65 (b) ( 1) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE ACCUSATION 
ON THE GROUNDS AND FOR THE REASON THAT 
TITLE 77, CHAPTER 7, SECTIONS 1 AND 2 UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953 IS SO VAGUE, INDEFINITE AND 
UNCERTAIN AS TO BE IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 7, 
ARTICLE I OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
Section 7, Article I of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah provides: 
C(No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or prop-
erty without due process of law." 
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That this prohibition applies in civil proceedings as well as 
criminal proceedings was decided in the case of Hilton Bros. 
Motor Company v. District Court, 82 Utah 372, 25 P. 2d. 595. 
While the right to hold public office does not have all 
of the characteristics of a true property right, it is such a 
property right as is protected by the due process clause. This 
matter was considered by the Supreme Court of Montana in 
the case of State v. Nor by, 165 Pac. 2d. 302. Section 27, Article 
3 of the Constitution of Montana is identical in wording with 
Section 7, Article I of the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
The Montana court stated in this case: 
''Of course the right to a public office is not property 
or an estate that may be passed by will, inheritance or 
other transfer. It is a public trust. However, the in-
cumbent of an office for a definite term, carrying a 
fixed salary, certainly has a property interest therein 
within the meaning of Section 2 7, Article 3 of our 
Constitution * * *. The right of an elected public 
official to possess and use the office and to exercise the 
privilege of the rights therein to the exclusion of others 
and until properly removed, certainly constituted a 
property interest within the meaning of these sections." 
Under the holding in the case of Snowden v. Hughes, 321 
U.S. I, 88 L. ed. 497, the right to hold state office is not pro-
tected by the 14th amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States. In this section, however, we do cite some federal 
cases, because, as was pointed out by this court in the case of 
Unternzyer v. State Tax Commission, 102 Utah 214, 129 P. 
2d 881: 
''The due process clause of the state constitution is 
substantially the same as the Fifth and Fourteenth 
amendments to the Federal Constitution. Decisions of 
10 
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the Supreme Court of the United States on the due 
process clauses of the Federal Constitution are 'highly 
persuasive' as to the application of that clause of our 
state constitution.'' 
There is a well established line of cases under these 
provisions holding that no statute may be enforced where the 
language of the statute is so vague, uncertain or indefinite 
that a reader of the statute cannot detremine readily from the 
face of the statute what acts are prohibited thereby. 
One of the landmarks cases in this field of the law, and 
a case wkhich is commonly cited by cases which follow is the 
case of Connally v. General Construction Co., 296 U.S. 385 
70 L. ed. 322, decided by the Supreme Court of the United 
States in 1926. This case was concerned with an 8 hour day 
statute of the state of Oklahoma which carried certain penal 
provisions. In holding this penal law in violation of the 14th 
Amendment, the Supreme Court of the United States stated: 
cc ••• The dividing line between what is lawful and 
unlawful cannot be left to conjecture. The citizen can 
not be held to answer charges based upon penal statutes 
whose mandates are so uncertain that they will reason-
ably admit of different constructions. A criminal statute 
cannot rest upon an uncertain foundation. The crime 
and the elements constituting it, must be so clearly 
expressed that the ordinary person can intelligent! y 
choose, in advance, what course it is unlawful for him 
to pursue. Penal statutes prohibiting the doing of cer-
tain things, and providing punishment for their vio-
lation, should not admit of such a double meaning that 
the citizen may act upon the one conception of its 
requiren1ents and the courts upon another. 
" * * * The result is that the application of the law 
depends not upon a word of fixed meaning in itself, 
1 l 
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.. 
or one made definite by statutory or judicial definition, 
or by the context or other legitimate aid to its construc-
tion, but upon the probably varying impressions of 
juries as to whether given areas are or are not to be 
included within particular localities. The constitutional 
guaranty of due process cannot be allowed to rest upon 
a support so equivocal." 
Another frequently cited case in this field of the law arose 
111 regard to a Utah statute. One Joseph Musser and others 
were accused by the State of Utah of advocating the practice 
of polygamy. Evidently the State, not having sufficient evi-
dence to prove the actual practice of polygamy by the de-
fendants, charged them with advocating the practice in violation 
of Section 103-11-1, U.C.A. 1943, which made it an indictable 
misdemeanor for any two or more persons to conspire ttto 
commit any act injurious * * * to public morals." A con-
viction was had in the Third Judicial District Court, which 
conviction was affirmed on appeal to the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah. Certiorari was granted by the Supreme 
Court of the United States on the contention of the defendant 
that the statute he was accused of violating was so vague, 
indefinite and uncertain as to be in violation of the 14th 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. That 
court declined to interpret the Utah statute and remanded it 
to the Supreme Court of the State of lTtah for interpretation 
with the following admonition: 
nit is obvious that this is no narrowly drawn statute. 
We do not presume to give an interpretation as to what 
it may include. Standing by itself, it would seem to be 
warrant for conviction for agreement to do almost any 
act which a judge and jury might find at the moment 
contrary to his or its notions of what was good for 
12 
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health, morals, trade, commerce, justice or order. In 
some States the phrase ·injurious to public morals· 
would be likely to punish acts which it would not punish 
in others because of the varying policies on such mat-
ters, as use of cigarettes or liquor and the permissibility 
of gambling. This led to the inquiry as to whether the 
statute attempts to cover so much that it effectively 
covers nothing. Statutes defining crimes may fail of 
their purpose if they do not provide sotne reasonable 
standards of guilt. See, for example, United States v. 
L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 65 L. ed 516, 41 
S. Ct. 298, 14 ALR 1045. Legislation may run afoul 
of the Due Process Clause because it fails to give 
adequate guidance to those who would be law-abiding, 
to advise defendants of the nature of the offense with 
which they are charged, or to guide courts in trying 
those who are accused." 
This case is Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 92 L. ed. 562. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reconsidered the 
case in light of the decision from the Supremt Court of the 
United States. In a decision written by Mr. Justice Wade, 
the court held that they could give no narrower interpretation 
to the statute than the words of the statute themselves would 
seem to imply. The court further held that interpreted as 
the words of the statute must be interpreted, the statute was 
vague, uncertain and contrary to the provisions of the 14th 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The 
conviction was, therefore, reversed. The following pertinent 
language is from the Utah Supreme Court decision, State v. 
Musser, 223 P. 2d 193: 
CCThe problem which we must decide as stated above, 
must be answered in the negative. The argument before 
this court has developed no reason why we should 
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believe that the legislature intended, in using this 
language, that it should be limited to a meaning less 
broad than the words therein used would indicate in 
their ordinary sense. No language in this or any other 
statute of this state or other law thereof or any his-
torical fact or surrounding circumstance connected with 
the enactment of this statute has been pointed to as 
indicating that the legislature intended any limitation 
thereon other than that expressed on the face of the 
words used. We are therefore unable to place a con-
struction on these words which limits their meaning 
beyond their general meaning. The conviction of the 
defendants thereunder cannot be upheld. This part of 
the statute is therefore void for vagueness and un-
certainty under the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Federal Constitution." 
In the case of City of Price v. Jaynes} 191 P. 2d 606, the 
defendant had been convicted of violation of a city ordinance 
of Price City; which provided in part: 
( (Section 1. The right of the people of the City of 
Price, County of Carbon, State of Utah, to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers and effects against un-
reasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated. 
(Section 2. Any person violating any of the provisions 
of this ordinance, or any section thereof, shall be guilty 
of a misdemeanor * * * '' 
The court struck down this ordinance in the following 
language: 
( (In the case of this ordinance we have a naked dec-
laration of a policy or the recognition of a right of the 
people of the City of Price to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches 
and seizures without any definition of what, in the 
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"This ordinance does not reveal whether it is di-
rected against an unreasonable seizure of a person in 
his house or apart from it or both; whether it is in-
tended to prohibit an unlawful seizure of papers or 
effects from the body of a person in his house or club 
house, or structure in the City of Price or from the home 
of a person independently of seizure of or from his 
person. 
"As stated before, the Fourth Amendment has been 
implemented by Federal and state legislation defining 
reasonable searches and seizures and the basis for the 
same and the manner of accomplishing such search 
and seizure under different laws which provide for the 
search and/ or seizure and the conditions thereof. There 
has usually been sufficient in the legislation to permit 
delineation between what purports to be a reasonable 
or an unreasonable search or seizure. 
"The ordinance here in question is expressive only 
of an existing right and a declared policy. It does 
not set out with sufficient definiteness the act or acts 
prohibited or denounced. 
"The declared policy is not sufficiently implemented 
by standards from which it can be determined what is 
or what is not under various situations a lawful or 
unlawful search or seizure. Evidently the test of what 
is an unreasonable search or seizure is left to standards 
not prescribed in the ordinance of Price City but to the 
exploration in fields of law which prescribe such 
standards for the state of Utah or the other states. 
This leaves the tests too much in the air and dependent 
in each case on what the magistrate hearing the case 
may within the light of his very limited or plenary 
knowledge conclude to be reasonable or unreasonable. 
nThe acts condemned as unreasonable searches and 
seizures are nowhere defined in reference to the re-
sults necessary to be accomplished. The ordinance is 
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general and vague and entirely too indefinite and 
uncertain. For the reasons above stated, the ordinance 
is a nullity." 
Another Utah case setting forth this principle is the case 
of Henrie v. Rocky Mountain Packing Corporation, Utah 202 
P. 2d 727. In that case the court stated: 
nit is a principle too familiar to require citation of 
authority, that penal statutes, to be constitutional, must 
be clear and definite in their terms so that there may 
be known exactly what conduct is prescribed." 
Some cases frorn other states applying the same principle 
are People of tbe State of l\1ichigan v. Joseph Sarnoff, 140 
A.L.R. 1206: 
c]t is fundamental that a penal law cannot be sus-
~ 
tained unless its mandates are so clearly expressed 
that any ordinay person can determine in advance what 
he may or what he may not do under it. People v. 
Goulding, 275 Mich. 353, 359, 266 NW 378. 
Another such case is State v. Lanesboro Produce & Hatchery 
Co., (Minn.) 21 N.W. 2d. 792, 163 A.L.R. 1108. The lan-
guage of the court was as follows: 
( (In the Northwest Poultry case, this court stated, 
203 Minn. 440, 281 NW 754: (The uncertainty hit at 
is not the difficulty of ascertaining whether close cases 
fall within or without the prohibition of a statute, but 
whether the standard established by the statute is so 
uncertain that it cannot be determined with reasonable 
definiteness that any particular act is disapproved. 
Nash v. United States, 299 U.S. 373, 33 S Ct 780, 57 
L ed 1232; United States v. Wurzbach, 280 US 396, 
50 S Ct 167, 74 L ed 508.' 
nit was also stated at page 441 of 203 Minn., 281 
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NW 754: 'Due process requires that penal legislation 
expressed in general and flexible terms furnish a test 
based on knowable criteria which men of common 
intelligence who come in contact with the statute may 
use with reasonable safety in determining its com-
mand. Collins v. Com. of Kentucky, 234 US 634, 34 
S Ct. 924, 58 L ed 1510." 
See also Werner v. City of Knoxville, 161 F. Supp. 9. A 
very good annotation is found on this subject at 83 L. ed., page 
893. 
One of the latest expressions of the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah in this matter is the case of State v. Packard, 
250 P. 2d. 561. In this case the court struck down as being 
too vague and indefinite a statute making a criminal offense 
"failure to register with the Industrial Commission before 
commencing employment." In striking down this statute the 
court, speaking through Mr. Justice Crockett, stated: 
"The limitations of language are such that neither 
absolute exactitude of expression nor complete pre-
cison of meaning are to be expected,and such standard 
cannot be required. On the other hand there is no 
disagreement among the courts that where a rule is 
set up, the violations of which subjects one to criminal 
punishment, the restrictions upon conduct should be 
described with sufficient certainty, so that persons of 
ordinary intelligence desiring to obey the law, may 
know how to govern themselves in conformity with it, 
and that no one should be compelled at the peril of 
life, liberty or property, to speculate as to the meaning 
of penal statutes. Price v. Jaynes, supra; State v. 
Musser, supra; U.S. v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 
81, 41 S. Ct. 298, 65 L. ed 516; Stromberg v. People 
of State of Cal., 283 U.S. 359, 51 S. Ct. 532, 75 L. ed. 
1117; Connally v. General Construction Co., supra; 
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Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S. Ct. 618, 
83 L. ed 888; see Law Ed. Annotations in connection 
with latter two cases. 
((Concerning the question of uncertainty or vague-
ness of statutes, the authorities seem to be in accord 
that the test a statute must meet to be valid is: It must 
be sufficiently definite (a) to inform persons of ordi-
nary intelligence, who would be law abiding, what 
their conduct must be to conform to its requirements; 
(b) to advise a defendant accused of violating it just 
what constitutes the offense with which he is charged, 
and (c) to be susceptible of uniform interpretation and 
application by those charged with responsibility of 
applying and enforcing it." 
A statute is not void for indefiniteness or uncertainty if 
any one of the following conditions exist: 
A. 'fhe words used by the statute in describing the pro-
hibited activity are of such well known and precise meaning 
that reasonable men cannot differ as to their application and 
all reasonable men taking any given set of circumstances could 
determine without doubt whether or not such set of circum-
stances fit within or without the prohibition; or 
B. Though the v1ords themselves may not be subject to 
such definiteness, the statute in question itself sets up tests 
and standards to aid in determining whether or not any 
given act may fall within or without the terms of a prohibition; 
or 
C. The terms used in the statute are elsewhere defined 
in the statutes of the governing body which enacted the statute 
in question. 
Let us examine the statute under which this defendant 
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was convicted to determine how it meets any of the foregoing 
requirements. Section 77-7-1 provides 
CCAll officers not liable to impeachment shall be 
subject to removal for high crimes, misdemeanors and 
malfeasance in office as jn this chapter provided." 
We can ignore the first two terms, cchigh crimes" and ccmis-
demeanors,'' for the reason that the state did not accuse the 
defendant of such actions. The accusation clearly accuses him 
of ((malfeasance in office in violation of Title 77, Chapter 7, 
Sections 1 and 2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953." We must 
consider this statute then as if it merely read ccall officers not 
liable to impeachment should be subject to removal for mal-
feasance in office as in this chapter provided." 
Neither the chapter in question nor any other provtston 
in the laws of the State of Utah which we have been able to 
find purports to define the term ccmalfeasance." It is a term 
that means what the individual using or hearing it thinks 
it means. This is plainly evident from the Judge's instructions 
on the matter, which will be discussed in the next succeeding 
section. Nor can any help be found by resorting to the common 
law. CCMalfeasance" merely means wrong doing, and the 
word umalfeasance" is just as vague, uncertain and indefinite 
as are the words ((wrong doing." The authors of American 
Jurisprudence make the following statement in Vol. 43, page 
39: 
CCNot infrequently public officers are made removable 
or suspendable for malfeasance or misfeasance, or for 
misconduct or gross misconduct or for malconduct in 
office. These terms are difficult of exact definition." 
Perkins on Criminal Law discusses the uncertain meaning 
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of such terms as malfeasance and misfeasance and misconduct 
in office. On page 412 of this work the following statement 
ts found: 
((Confusion has been injected into this area of the 
law by resorting to a multiplicity of names or terms 
with varying degrees of generality or specificity. Mis-
conduct in office', for example, is used at times merely 
as a literal statement. In this sense it does not indicate 
a crime, but merely one of the ingredients of a crime 
and the phrase tnay have either one or two different 
meanings when employed to indicate a crime. This is 
because of the fact that some of the offenses of this 
nature have specific names of their own, such as ~ex­
tortion' or ~oppression', whereas others do not. Thus 
the phrase rna y be used in a generic sense as in a state-
ment ~oppression is one type of misconduct in office,' 
or it may be used as a specific name of the crime in 
referring to an offense of this nature which has no 
name of its own, such as a case in which a prosecuting 
attorney corruptly procured the release of a prisoner 
by improper use of a bond. When used to indicate a 
crime in either of these two senses mentioned, mis-
conduct in office is corrupt misbehavior by an officer 
in the execution of the duties of his office, or while 
acting under color of his office. 
((While misconduct in office is a term frequently 
employed, many substitutes have been used for this 
phrase in all of the meanings suggested, and the defi-
nition could be reworded by the substitution of any 
of the following: official misconduct, misbehavior in 
office, malconduct in office, malpractice in office, mis-
conduct in office and corruption in office. No doubt 
others have found their way into the cases. 
((In addition to the terms used to represent the entire 
area will be found others to indicate certain parts there-
of and these partitioning phrases may be based either 
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on the nature of the misbehavior or upon the mode 
of the misbehavior." 
If the Legislature is going to describe an offense by s.uch 
general terms, it is necessary in order to preserve the consti-
tutionality of the provisions that the Legislature either define 
the tern1 or lay down standards of conduct by which a person 
reading the law can detremine what is intended by the Legis-
lature. We will submit that such has not been done in regard 
to this statute. Furthermore, the jury in their deliberations 
were not in any way helped out by the instructions of the 
court, as v.-e will point out in the next succeeding section. 
II. THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY AS TO THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE OF 
MALFEASANCE IN OFFICE. 
Counsel does not mean to criticize the trial judge for the 
vague, uncertain and indefinite instructions which were given 
to the jury as to \Vhat constitutes malfeasance in office. The 
defects in the judge's instructions are inherent in the statute 
itself. Neither the district attorney for the defense attorney, 
in spite of diligent efforts, were very bel pful to the court in 
their requested instructions. The court in telling the jury 
what was malfeasance had to let the jury rely upon a subjective 
standard, as indeed the words of the statute will permit 
nothing else. The court instructed the jury as follows in regard 
to the definition of malfeasance: 
((For the purpose of this case, malfeasance in office 
is defined as follows: Malfeasance is the conscious 
doing of a wrongful act in his official capacity with 
the knowledge upon his part at the time of doing the 
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same that it is wrongful and that he had no right to 
do the same,and may consist of any one of the follow-
ing, to-wit: Evil doing, ill conduct, the doing of what 
one ought not to do, the unjust performance of some 
act which the party had no right to do, or the com-
mission of some act which is positively unlawful." 
Inasmuch as the defendant was accused of no high crime 
or rnisdemeanor in the accusation itself, the last few words of 
the instructions seem surplusage, but let us look at the others. 
Malfeasance is evil doing. Evil doing by whose standards? 
By the standards of each individual member of the jury? Mal-
feasance is ill conduct. Ill conduct measured by what standards? 
There are no standards contained elsewhere in the instructions 
nor in the statute. The next few words are the most uncertain 
and ambiguous of all: ctthe doing of what one ought not 
to do." Perhaps one member of a jury might think a Com-
missioner should attend every Commission meeting, and that 
a commissioner was guilty of malfeasance if he were absent 
for a day. Perhaps another might think that a Commissioner 
should have decided a certain discretionary matter in one 
way, whereas he had decided it in another way. To hold each 
one of us guilty of malfeasance for ctthe doing of what one 
ought not to do" certainly imposes upon mere mortals a 
Christ -like standard of conduct. 
The purpose of instructions to a jury is to lay down for 
the jury specific standards and guides for their deliberation. 
It is to insure that each member of the jury will approach 
the set of facts with the same attitude and the same standards 
as every other juror, with the same attitude and the same 
standards as the trial judge, and with the same attitude and 
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with the same standards as were intended by the legislature. 
This vague and uncertain instruction does not do that for a 
jury. It lays down no objective tests. It allows each member 
of the jury to decide for himself what is right and what is 
wrong. This much is certain. Between the wholly bad and 
the wholly good there are infinite shades of gray, one fading 
into the other with scarcely perceptible change. Furthermore, 
the degree of change is to a large extent in the eye of the 
beholder. That the words ((evil doing," (till conduct," ((the 
doing of what one ought not to do" are indefinite and un-
certain in their meaning is too clear to require further 
comment. 
Instruction 3, in which the court attempts to apply tests 
and standards to the evidence in this case, does nothing to 
correct the uncertainties and ambiguities in Instruction 2, for 
the reason that Instruction 3 is based upon and presupposes 
a complete understaiding by the jury of the elements of mal-
feasance, which as has been pointed out, the instruction had 
failed to give them, because of its uncertainness and indefinite-
ness, and also because of the inherent inability to give any 
certainness and definiteness to the word ((malfeasance." 
In giving his definition of malfeasance, the court obviously 
picked the language used from certain dicta in the case of 
Law v. Smith, 34 Utah 394, at page 413. It should be pointed 
out, however, that Law v. Smith does not involve itself with 
the question of instructions to the jury, because that case 
never got to the stage of giving instructions. Furthermore, the 
definition of malfeasance contained in Law v. Smith, and 
\vhich is picked up and used in the instruction in this case, is 
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not set forth by the court as a proper instruction. The court 
sets forth the language given as ((the ordinary definition 
given to the term (malfeasance' by lexicographers." Certainly 
it is not sufficient that a jury be instructed as to the elements 
of an offense by reading a mere dictionary definition of the 
offense concerned. An instruction requires more than mere 
lexicography. Otherwise an instruction to a jury could be 
brief in the extreme. Mere general definitions usually are so 
brief as to leave much to the subjective interpretation of the 
person reading the dictionary. 
That the judge realized that he was leaving the matter 
up to the objective standards of the jury is evident from the 
remarks which he made during the motion for a new trial 
(R. 375). 
((We get down to the propostion of whether or not 
eight jurors in a case like this think a man should be 
discharged or not. After all what you are doing is 
discharging a man from his job. In big corporations 
the boss fires one and in this instance it takes eight 
jurors to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the man should be discharged." 
The judge vvas consistent with this throughout the instruc-
tions. He left it up to the members of the jury as to whether 
under their own standards of what they felt \vas right and 
what they felt was wrong, the defendant should be fired from 
his office of City Commissioner. 
Another portion of the instructions relating to what con-
stitutes malfeasance is highly improper. This element runs 
throughout the instructions and this theory is found in In-
structions 2, 3 and 6. The court instructed the jury to the effect 
24 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that a person was guilty of n1alfeasance if he did, while holding 
a public office, an act which was prohibited by law, whether 
or not he had any evil intent or motive, and whether or not 
he knew of the existence of the law, because, to quote the 
language of the court in regard to knowledge: C(This latter 
elen1ent the law imputes to every person, because the law con-
clusively presumes that all persons know the law and ignorance 
thereof is no defense or excuse." The presumption of knowl-
edge of the law does not extend from the criminal law into 
malfeasance cases. This was clearly set out in the case of 
Law v. Smith, supra. In that case the defendant had presented a 
false claim which was in direct violation of law. The court, 
however, held that such \Vas not enough in and of itself; 
that such claim must be presented C(with full knowledge that 
he had no legal right to the money." It certainly was not the 
intention of the legislature to make a public officer removable 
from office as a matter of law any time he deviated from 
the law regarding the fulfillment of his duties, whether or 
not he knew at the time that he was violating the law. Mal-
feasance requires a guilty knowledge and an intent to do wrong 
in all cases and not mere inadvertence, negligence or even 
failure to know the law. 
POINT III. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT NO. I 
OF THE ACCUSATION. 
POINT IV. 'THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANT THE RIGHT TO TAKE THE DEPOSITION 
OF WITNESSES PRIOR TO THE TRIAL, OR IN THE AL-
25 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TERNATIVE, THE RIGHT TO HAVE A PRELIMINARY 
HEARING. 
POINT V. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL AS TO 
COUNTS 2 AND 3, MADE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE 
DISMISSJ}.L OF COUNT I, AND ALSO IN DENYING 
THE MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
A. General 
Counsel desires to discuss the three points listed above 
jointly, as they all are concerned with the rather involved story 
of what happened to Count No. 1 and its effect upon the 
deliberations of the jury in this case. 
The evidence as to Count No. 1 is set out in the intro-
ductory portion of this brief. The evidence was insufficient 
to establish a public offense because the evidence does 
not show that Commissioner Geurts had received any re-
ward, promise of reward, or had any expectation of a reward 
at the time he joined with the other City Commissioners in 
voting to purchase the Hansen property for the city. That 
such an element must exist in order to sustain a charge of 
v;rongdoing on the part of a public official is well established 
by the decided cases, which will be hereafter reviewed. 
The indictment from the grand jury on the criminal case 
charged the defendant with the commission of acts which 
constitute Count 1, as we have set it forth heretofore. This 
count of the indictment did not charge that Commissioner 
Geurts received the money or had a promise of expectation 
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that he would receive the money prior to the time the Hansen 
property was purchased for the golf course, nor did it allege 
that the receipt of the money in any way affected his action 
as a city commissioner. Counsel for the defense moved to 
quash this count of the indictment because it failed to so 
charge. After giving the district attorney an opportunity to 
amend the indictment, which he failed to do, Judge Faux 
quashed this count of the criminal indictment. When th~ 
district attorney some eight months later filed his accusation 
in the civil case, he recharged the allegations in Count 1 
in almost the identical form as that in which they had been 
charged in the criminal indictment. The defendant once again 
moved to dismiss Count 1 from the accusations on two 
grounds-first, that its dismissal in the criminal action was res 
adjudicata; and secondly, that it still had the same inherent 
defect, namely, that it did not charge that Commissioner 
Geurts had received the money or a promise of money prior 
to his official action, or that the receipt of the money affected 
his official action (R. 3). 
At the argument on this motion to dismiss, which was 
very heated, counsel for the defense stated to the trial court 
that the District Attorney did not have evidence of any promise 
of payment prior to the official act; that he knew he did not 
have it; that he knew that he could never get Count 1 to a 
jury. His sole purpose in attempting to reestablish this count 
was in the hope that the rather inflammatory nature of this 
evidence so far as the arousing of suspicion is concerned 
would aid him to get a conviction on Counts 2 and 3. The 
District Attorney denied this, and orally stated to Judge Van 
Cott during the argument that he did have evidence to show 
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that Comm.issioner Geurts had an agreement to be paid money 
for his vote prior to the time his vote was cast. On this oral 
representation Judge Van Cott denied the motion to dismiss. 
Counsel for the defense was certain in his own mind that 
the district attorney had no such evidence, as we believed 
that we had talked to all of the witnesses that knew anything 
about this particular matter. Accordingly, we filed a demand 
with the district attorney for a list of all of the witnesses whom 
he would use to prove Count 1 (R. 8). Thereupon we gave 
notice of the taking of the depositions of all of these \vit-
nesses (R. 13). The district attorney moved the court for 
an order suppressing our right to take the depositions of these 
witnesses. Judge Van Cott granted this motion. Thereupon 
counsel for the defendant moved for a preliminary hearing 
as to the accusations. This motion was denied. 
At the trial of this case the evidence as to Count 1 came 
in just as the counsel for the defense had told the court during 
the argument that it would come in. The district attorney 
had none of the evidence which he had represented he would 
have. The evidence was fatally defective in the same manner 
that the charge itself Vv~as fatally defective. The court there-
upon granted the motion of the defense to dismiss Count 1 
(R. 276). Thereafter counsel for the plaintiff moved the court 
to grant a mistrial as to Counts 2 and 3 on the ground that 
the evidence which they had received as to Count 1 could 
not help but affect the delibertions of the jury as to the other 
two counts (R. 318). This motion was denied. Following the 
verdict the counsel for the defense moved for a new trial 
on the ground, among others, that the jury might well have 
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been influenced in its deliberations by the evidence which it 
had heard as to Count 1 ( R. 62) . This motion for a new 
trial was denied. 
The inflammatory nature of the evidence in Count 1 is 
quite evident. While the evidence does not prove any public 
ofi"ense, it is of such a nature as to give rise to a great deal 
of speculation and suspicion, especially in view of the well 
recognized tendency on the part of members of the public to 
suspect the worst of public officials, and the further fact that 
the general public regards the making of campaign contri-
butions as a rather tainted activity. Having this evidence 
before the jury could not help but affect their deliberations 
on the other counts. It could not help but affect their general 
attitude toward Commissioner Geurts. The district attorney 
was well aware of this. His actions in this matter show a 
complete lack of good faith. l-Ie knew when he reinstated 
Count 1 by tneans of accusation that he could not prove an 
offense. He knew he could not prove an offense when he rep-
resented to Judge Van Cott at the time of the argument on 
the motion to dismiss that he had sufficient evidence. He 
wanted that count in, not because he hoped to get to a jury 
on it, but because he believed it would color the deliberations 
of the jury. 
In the argument on the motion for new trial counsel for 
the defense called the district attorney to the stand. The 
district attorney was asked this question: 
ttl will ask you whether or not it is true that shortly 
before this accusation was :filed on February 15, you 
told Mr. Boden in substance and effect that you were 
filing this civil proceeding for the purpose of reinstating 
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Count I because you knew, without that, you couldn't 
hope for a conviction?" (R. 369). 
After a number of evasive answers and repetitions of the 
question, the district attorney finally admitted: 
t(A. Well, I could have made that statement to him. 
However, I maintain that I could get a conviction 
on aonther count-Count 2" (R. 3 70). 
Apparently the district attorney achieved his purpose. He did 
Mit get before the jury the evidence in Count 1, even though 
he did not get that count to the jury, and he did get his con-
viction on Count 2. 
B. Point III 
We maintain that the court erred in denying the motion 
to quash Count 1 for two reasons: First, the action of Judge 
Faux in the criminal case was res adjudicata; and second, the 
same reasons for dismissal that were present in the criminal 
case were present in the civil case. 
1. Res Adjudicata 
It is a fundamental principle of law that there can be 
only one action for the redress of one wrong. Once a matter 
has been determined and the parties have had their day in 
court, the matter is settled and ended. In civil practice this 
principle is referred to as t(red adjudicata," and in criminal 
la\v it is referred to as ((double jeopardy." However, the 
principle is the same in each case. 
In order for this doctrine to have application, three con-
ditions must exist: 
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(a) The actions must be between the same parties or 
between parties having a privity with each other. 
(b) The issues must be the same, and 
(c) The relief sought must be the same. 
It matters not that one action may be criminal in nature 
and another civil in nature if in fact the above conditions 
are met. There is no hard and fast distinction between the 
administration of civil justice and criminal justice. Both are 
handled in the same courts. It is true that in many cases a 
single act may give rise to both criminal and civil actions which 
may both proceed to judgment. This results from the fact 
that often only the second of the above three identities exists. 
As a usual thing, while the defendant may be the same person, 
the plaintiffs are different parties, the plaintiff in a criminal 
action being the state, and the plaintiff in the civil action being 
the person wronged. As a usual thing also, the relief sought 
is different, the object of the criminal action being punishment 
and the object of the civil action being remedial. 
The following language is found in 30 Am. fur. 1005: 
ccThe general rule that a judgment rendered in a 
criminal action rna y not be received in evidence in a 
subsequent civil action to bar such action, or to estab-
lish the truth of the facts upon which it was rendered, 
is subject to a number of well-defined exceptions. 
Thus, where the subsequent action, although civil in 
form, is quasi-criminal in its nature, it is frequently 
regarded as a second prosecution for the same offense, 
and as such, barred by a prior conviction or acquittal. 
This exception to the general rule is recognized, how-
ever, only where the object of the quasi-criminal or 
penal action is punishment and not compensation." 
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In this case the relief sought in the existing action is 
identical with a portion of the relief sought in the criminal 
action, namely, removal from office. 
A United States Supreme Court case which discusses the 
matter is the case of Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 397, 82 
L. ed 921. In that case the defendant was convicted of income 
tax evasion. The government also proceeded against him in 
a civil action attempting to collect a fraud penalty on the same 
set of facts that give rise to the criminal action. The court 
held that because the relief sought was different, namely, 
punishment in the one case and compensation in the another, 
both cases could proceed independently. It went on to point 
out, however, that if the object of the two actions had been 
the same that both could not proceed, and that either a con-
viction or acquittal as to one would be a bar to the other. 
In the case now before the court the parties were identical, 
the issues were identical. All of the relief sought in this case, 
namely removal from office, was provided by the statute under 
which the criminal case was brought. It would be impossible 
to find two cases where the three identities discussed above are 
more clearly present. The fact that one is a criminal case with 
civil overtones, while the other is sort of a hybrid-civil-criminal 
case, does not destroy this identity. 
Counsel for the defendant knows of nothing either in the 
statutes or the decided cases \-vhich would indicate that the 
state in a situation such as this may have two bites at the same 
apple. 
2. The Allegations of the Accusation 
Let us now pass from the question of res adjudicata to 
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the merits of the matter and determine whether or not Count 
1 of the accusation did state an offense. 
AI though there is some minor difference in the language 
between Count 1 in this case anad Count 1 in Case No. 16525, 
the allegations are identical. In each of them the charge is 
made that the defendant accepted a real estate commission, 
or a portion thereof which in some vague way, not stated or 
shown, is related to a transaction which the city made in 
purchasing certain property. We had already been through 
this matter once \vith Judge Faux as to whether or not such an 
allegation states a public offense. Judge Faux ruled that it 
did not. 
The fatal defect in Count 1 of the Accusation, as in 
Count 1 of the indictment, is that the State does not state 
the reason that the defendant received a part of the commis-
sion. From all that appears, it might reasonably be assumed 
that the real estate agent used a portion of the commission 
to purchase items at a store owned by the defendant or that 
he used a portion of the commission to pay off a loan which 
he owed to the defendant. As a matter of fact, what happened, 
and what the District Attorney knew happened, is that the 
real estate agent made a political contribution to the defendant. 
The crux of the matter is why did he make it? If the payment 
was made for the purpose of influencing the defendant's vote 
on the City Commission, then the defendant is guilty of a 
public offense, regardless of the guise under which it was 
made. On the other hand, if the payment was not made for 
the purpose of influencing the defendant's vote, it is not 
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\Y/hat the State was attempting to do was to imply, 
without saying so, that the defendant took a bribe. It was 
attempting to accuse by innuendo, by casting suspicion. An 
accusation put in this light makes it impossible for the de-
fendant to assert a defense, for he could have done the act 
of which he is accused without commiting any offense. 
The District Attorney was evident! y attempting by the 
language used in court to bring the allegation under Sec. 
10-6-38, U.C.A. 1953, prohibitng officers of municipal cor-
porations from being directly or indirectly interested in any 
contract, work or business, or in the sale of any article, the 
expense, price or consideration of which is paid from the 
treasury. Under this section the District Attorney fails to 
state facts sufficient to bring the matter within the statute. 
It is necessary, to be a violation of this statute, that at the time 
of the transaction with the city the officer have an interest. 
The purpose of this statute is clear. A public officer in voting 
upon a public matter should have the public interest at heart. 
He should not be serving two masters. He should not have 
any reason other than his duty as a public official to vote for 
or against the purchase of any property. Therefore, it follows 
that the interest must be a present one, one existing at the 
time the property is purchased. It follows, therefore, that in 
order to violate this statute the public officer must either have 
received or have been promised, or must have an expectation 
that he will receive a reward if he votes in a certain \Yay. This 
the District Attorney did not charge. 
The requirements of an allegation to state a cause of action 
under 77-7-1, U.C.A. 1953, are identical with the requirements 
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under Sec. 10-6-36, U.C.A. 1953, or if anything, the require-
ments are stronger under 77-7-1, whereunder this charge is 
laid. 77-7-1 makes an officer removable for "high crimes, 
misdemeanors, or malfeasance." Sec. 10-6-36 makes removable 
any officer who shall c «wilfully omit the performance of any 
duty or wilfully and corruptly be guilty of oppression, mal-
conduct or misfeasance in office." Thus, it will be seen that 
Sec. 10-6-36 is by far the broader section. It encompasses 
everything encompassed in 77-7-1, and something besides. 
Therefore, it follows sylogistically that any charge which fails 
to state an offense under 10-6-36 could not state an offense 
under 77-7-1. 
This very matter has been passed upon by the courts in 
a number of jurisdictions. In the case of People v. DeysherJ 
40 P. 2d 259, the Supreme Court of California had before 
it a situation where the Supervisor of county roads was indicted 
under a charge that he had leased road machinery to a con-
tractor to whom had previously been awarded a contract 
for improving county rodas. The section under which the 
indictment vvas laid was almost identical with Sec. 10-6-38, 
U.C.A. 1953. This California statute, Sec. 4322 of the Code, 
provided in pertinent part: 
CCNo member of the board may be interested, directly 
or indirect! y * * * in any contract made by the board, 
or other person, on behalf of the county, for the * * * 
improvement of roads * * * . " 
In considering the question as to when the interest of the 
board member must arise in order to constitute a violation 
of the statute, the Supreme Court stated: 
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((Neither the briefs nor our own investigation has 
disclosed any case deciding what facts sufficiently 
establish such an interest in a public contract as will 
subject an officer to punishment under said section 71 
or similar statute. But aid can be obtained from civil 
cases considering the sufficiency of evidence to prove 
such an interest of an officer in a public contract as 
to invalidate it. Outside of a general discussion of 
the public policy, underlying the statutory prohibition, 
the cases of Stockton P. & S. Co. v. Wheeler, 68 Cal. 
App. 592, 229 P. 1020; County of Shasta v. Moody, 
90 Cal. App. 519, 265 P. 1032; Hobbs, Wall & Co. 
v. Moran, 109 Cal. App. 316, 293 P. 145; Moody v. 
Shuffleton, 203 Cal. 100, 262 P. 1095, cited by re-
spondent, are not presently helpful, because in each 
case the prohibited interest existed at the award of 
contract. The purchase, after award of contract and 
without previous agreement so to do, by the contract 
of material used in the performance of the contract 
from a member of the board awarding the contract, 
or from a corporation of which such member is a 
stockholder or employee, does not create, in such 
member, an interest in the contract which will invali-
date it." 
To the satne effect see State v. Abernathy, a Louisiana 
case, 194 So. 19. In the case of W an·ell t'. Jurden, a Nevada 
case, 132 Pac. 1158, the school district entered into a contract 
for the construction of a building. Thereafter the contractor 
purchased from a board member certain materials which 
went into the building. The contract was attacked as being 
illegal because of this purchase. The court held that the con-
tract did not violate the statute unless the board member had 
acquired or had been promised an interest in the contract 
at the time he voted thereon, or had other interest therein 
that might influence his vote. 
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In the case of O'Neil v. Town of Auburn, a Washington 
case, reported at 135 Pac. 1000, a contractor was awarded a 
road contract from the city. Thereafter he purchased cement 
from a company owned by the Mayor. It was alleged that the 
contract with the city was illegal under a statute similar to 
the conflict of interest statutes in the state of Utah. The 
court held that there was no violation of the contract unless 
the conflict of interest existed at the time of awarding the 
contract. 
The same matter was passed upon by the New Jersey 
cour tin the case of Fredericks v. Burrough of Wanaque, 112 
Atl. 309: 
''But v;e are referred to no case which intimates 
that in the absence of a corrupt understanding or 
agreement of the contractor with the member of the 
council voting for the contract, for the purpose of as-
serting the provisions of the Crimes Act, a resolution 
of its municipality, otherwise legal is rendered illegal 
by the subsequent action of the contractor in purchasing 
his material from a recognized source of supply, the 
proprietor of which happened to be a member of the 
governing body which awarded the contract. The con-
tention of the defendant quite obviously is resolvable 
upon the fallacious argument of conduct post hoc and 
not proper hoc; for the manifest test of the legality 
of the contract must be determined as of the time when 
the resolution was passed and not by the free act of 
the plaintiff in purchasing materials. If it u·as free 
of criminal taint at its inception, the subsequent action 
of the contractor in executing the contract cannot relate 
back, so as to vitiate it: unless such ex post facto 
action can be connected with a prior corrupt agreement 
or understanding with a member of the governing body 
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in pursuance of which the resolution was passed." 
Italics added) . 
Another similar case is the case of People v. Southern 
Surety Company, a Michigan case, 163 N.W. 769. There the 
Supreme Court of Michigan stated: 
((The court found as a matter of fact that prior to 
the making of the contracts between Jansma and the 
city there was no talk, agreement, contract or under-
standing between plaintiff and Jansma to the effect 
that defendant Jansma would purchase any material 
from the plaintiff for such improvement and with this 
finding of fact, we agree. Broadly stated and carried 
to its logical conclusion, the position of the defendant 
is that an alderman is prohibited by the charter pro-
vision under consideration from sustaining any busi-
ness relationships whatsoever with any person who 
has a contract with the municipality of which he is 
an officer. We are of the opinion that it was not the 
legislative intention to carry the inhibition so far." 
The defendant in this case violated no law or committed 
no act of malfeasance unless he was given a promise of some-
thing prior to the time the city purchased the property in 
question. If it is the position of the State that every public 
officer who has received a political contribution from an indi-
vidual who had theretofore done business with the public 
body with which such officer was connected, then indeed there 
are few, if any, public officers within the State of Utah who 
are not subject to removal from office. 
POINT IV 
Count 1 should therefore have been dismissed prior to 
the trial on the motion made by the defendant. Upon the 
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denial of this motion for dismissal, the defendant then at-
tempted to take the depositions of the State's witnesses, or in 
the alternative to have a preliminary hearing. Had either of 
these procedures been allowed, the defective character of the 
evidence so far as it pertained to Count 1 would have come 
to the attention of the court and the defendant could either 
have renewed the motion for dismissal, based upon the evi-
dence, or have moved for a summary judgment. We were 
denied the right of either the civil remedy or the criminal 
remedy. 
The rules of criminal procedure of the State of Utah 
provide that before a person can be held to trial in the District 
Court on a felony charge brought on complaint and infor-
mation, he must be given a preliminary hearing before a 
magistrate. The twofold purpose of this is obvious. It is a 
safeguard that the individual will not be called to stand 
trial before a jury in the district court unless there is sufficient 
evidence to go to the jury as to the con1mission of the offense. 
Secondly, it assures that extraneous matters will not get before 
the jury. 
The same safeguard is given to parties tn civil actions. 
Under the code of civil procedure the parties have the right 
to take the depositions of witnesses prior to the trial. Depo-
sitions serve a three-fold purpose--1, perpetuation of testi-
mony; 2, discovery; and 3, to form a basis for a motion for 
sumn1ary judgment where it appears that the evidence taken 
as a whole is insufficient to take a case to a jury. Had the 
defendant been granted either of the rights guaranteed to 
defendants under the code of criminal procedure or the code 
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of civil procedure, the evidence under Count 1 would never 
have been heard by the jury. The trial court, however, held 
that because this was a quasi-criminal case, the defendant 
was afforded the protection of neither mode of procedure. 
Certainly this does not appear to be a logical deduction to 
draw from the applicable statutes. The cases from this court 
hold that removal proceedings under Chapter 77, Title 7, are 
civil in nature. See Burk v. Knox, 59 Utah 596, 206 P. 711; 
Skeen v. Payne, 32 Utah 295, 90 P. 440; Skeen v. Craig, 31 
Ut 29 86 P. 487. Based upon these cases, the court held that 
we were not entitled to the protection afforded defendants 
under the rules of criminal procedure. On our attempt to obtain 
the rights afforded to defendants in civil cases, the trial court 
denied us these rights, based upon the provisions of Section 
77-7-11, Utah Code Annotated, which provides: 
((The trial must be by jury and shall be conducted 
in all respects in the same manner as the trial of an 
indictment or information for a felony." 
We urge upon the court that the obvious intention of this 
section is that only the trial of the case, and not the procedure 
prior to trial, shall be governed by the rules of criminal pro-
cedure. Sections 77-7-5 to 77-7-10 inclusive are concerned 
with matters preceding trial. As to these matters the code of 
criminal procedure cannot be applicable. The section above 
quoted obviously refers only to the trial itself, and not to those 
matters preceding or following the trial. We therefore should 
have had the rights granted to parties under the code of civil 
procedure, and, having been denied those rights, have been 
denied the due process of law guaranteed to defendants in 
the courts of the State of Utah. 
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Having failed to secure the dismissal of Count 1, due to 
the defect \vhich appeared on its face, and having been denied 
the right to test the sufficiency of the evidence at pretrial 
proceedings, the defendant, at the close of the state's evidence, 
did the only thing he could do to protect himself. Following 
the dismissal of Count 1 he moved for a mistrial on the other 
t\vo counts (R. 318). That this should have been granted 
appears too clear to require argument. 
As has been pointed out above, although the facts proved 
under Count 1 do not constitute an offense, they do give rise 
to innuendos and suspicions which are much more serious 
in their nature than anything that was proved under Counts 
2 and 3. The suspicion of the jury could not help but have 
been aroused. ·The things they had heard in support of Count 
1 could not have helped but color the attitude of any juror 
untrained in the law toward the defendant in the case. The 
instruction of the judge that they were to disregard the 
evidence let in as to Count 1 did no more than to accentuate 
the effects of this evidence in the minds of the jury. We agree 
that there is a large measure of discretion in the trial judge 
as to whether or not occurrences which happen during the 
trial are of such a nature as to prejudice the rights of the 
defendant. However, such discretion is not unlimited, and 
in a case such as this it appears clearly an abuse of discretion 
to deny the motion for a mistrial. The Supreme Court of t~1e 
State of Oregon in the case of Guedon v. Rooney, 87 P. 2d. 
209, in overriding the discretion of the trial court in denying 
a motion for mistrial, stated: 
nln view of the entire record we are strongly of the 
opinion that a mistrial should have been ordered by 
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the circuit court. In the first place, the court committed 
error in permitting English to give in evidence his con-
clusion as to the manner in which Wilson was driving. 
Furthermore, the inferences conveyed to the jury on 
the extended direct examination of Rooney by the 
the plaintiff, when he was recalled to the stand, were 
extremely prejudical. The statements of the annontator 
in the A.L.R. notes to Paul v. Drawn, 108 V. 458, 
189 A. 144, 109 A.L.R. 1085, are peculiarly appro-
priate as applied to that examination of Rooney: 
(( tlmproper questions may be prejudicial in various 
ways, including the following: They may plainly con-
vey information excluded by the rules of evidence; 
may hint at the existence of significant though admis-
sible facts, with or ·without a suggestion as to their 
nature, may, by the assumptions therein contained, and 
notwithstanding, the answers being prevented, impress 
upon the jury, by a mere show of proof, matters which 
are not admissible in evidence and which perhaps could 
not be proved, as inferred, even if opportunity were 
afforded, and may, by reason of the objections made, 
emphasize the facts suggested more effectively than 
might be done by answers admitted without objection.' 
(( It seems to be the invariable quality of questions 
the asking of which may require a reversal that in 
themselves, and without any answers made, they call to 
the attention of, or suggest to, the jury some fact or 
claim prejudical to the opposite party and concerning 
which counsel has no right to inquire." 
t tW e are not unmindful of the rule that wide dis-
cretion is vested in the trial court in deciding whether 
a mistrial shall be declared. That discretion, however, 
is not absolute. No general rule, it is true, can be laid 
down as to what specific set of circumstances will result 
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in a mistrial. We are of the opinion, from all the 
facts in the case before us, that the defendants did not 
have a fair trial." 
Here the situation is much more serious than a case where 
simply a few improper questions were asked and answered. 
Here a full day's trial was devoted to the abortive effort to 
prove Count 1. This court is aware from the preceding dis-
cussion in this brief as to the inflammatory nature of that 
evidence. Furthermore, in view of the fact that the court 
dismissed Count 1 on motion of the defendant, the defendant 
could not put in his own evidence to show his interpretation 
of the facts of Count 1. These facts were left before the jury 
in their most damaging form. 
As the District Attorney reluctantly admitted under 
oath that he had stated, there would probably have been no 
conviction under the other two counts had the jury not heard 
the evidence as to Count 1. The motion for a mistrial should 
clearly have been granted at the close of the State's evidence, 
and the motion for a new trial should have been granted as 
to Counts 2 and 3 on the ground that the jury had been 
improperly influenced by the evidence which they heard as 
to Count 1. 
POINT VI. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 
CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE OF THE DEFENDANT TO 
THE JUROR RAY H. WILSON. 
POINT VII. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL ON 
THE GROUNDS THAT THE JURORS IKEDA AND JEN-
SEN HAD ANSWERED FALSELY TO CERTAIN VOIR 
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DIRE QUESTIONS, WHICH FALSE ANSWERS HAD 
PREVENTED THE DEFENDANT FROM TAKING A 
CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE FROM INTELLIGENTLY EX-
ERCISING HIS PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES. 
During the voir dire examination of the Juror Wilson 
the following occurred: 
((THE COURT: And I don't want to know what your 
opinion is, if you have one. I say we don't want to know 
what it is, but do you at this time have an opinion 
about the truth or the falsity of these accusations7 
((Mr. Wilson: I have an opinion but I might be able 
to change it in case the evidence showed it wrong. 
((THE COURT: Do you believe that it would require 
evidence to remove the opinion that you now have? 
((Mr. Wilson: I think so." 
The court then went on with a rather lengthy examination 
of the juror Wilson, in which he explained to him the pre-
sumption of innocence and the necessity for proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Wilson agreed with these principles and 
said that he would attempt to follow them. At one point during 
the questioning by the judge as to whether or not he would 
require more proof in this case than in another case, he stated: 
nW ell, if I say yes, I would say it is because I think 
public officials should be above reproach in whatever 
office they have been elected to, and that there should 
be no suspicion of anything of that kind." 
As a concluding question the court asked, {{And if you were 
a defendant in this case, do you think you would get a fair 
and impartial trial if you were sitting on the jury and seven 
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uthers like you?" to which Mr. Wilson replied, ((I would 
think so." At no time, however, did Wilson change or repudiate 
his statement that he had formed an opinion about the case 
\vhich it would require evidence to remove. He did not change 
his statement that it would require more proof than the average 
case. 
Counsel challenged Wilson for cause, but the challenge 
was denied by the court. Wilson ultimately did serve on the 
jury, because in spite of his answers, there were others on the 
jury panel who, although they had answered the questions 
technically correctly, caused counsel for the defense more 
concern than did the juror Wilson and the peremptory chal-
lenges were exhausted on these other jurors. 
The Juror Ikeda answered the routine question as to 
'vhether or not he had formed or expressed an opinion in 
the case in the negative. His examination was not extensive. 
After the trial of the case, however, counsel learned from a 
nephew of the defendant that a short time previous to the 
trial of the case the nephew had taken his automobile to 
Ikeda's repair shop for some work thereon. Upon hearing 
that the nephew's name was ((Geurts," Ikeda asked: ((Are 
you related to the crooked Commissioner?'' This information 
was placed in the file by affidavit in support of the motion 
for new trial (R. 67). Ikeda placed in a counter-affidavit (R. 
69). The court denied a motion for new trial on this ground. 
One of the things that greatly concerned counsel for the 
defense in selecting a jury was the matter of prejudice that 
might exist in the minds of prospective jurors arising out of 
matters having no connection with the charges against Com-
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mtsstoner Geurts. In the few weeks preceding the trial of 
this case there had been before the Commission a number 
of very heated hearings, protests and discussions involving 
the activities of the Public Safety Department of the city 
government and the removal of the chief of police. Feelings 
had run high on the matter in the community, and counsel 
was very desirous that no member of the jury be a person 
that had been involved in any such proceedings. Accordingly, 
counsel requested the judge to question the jurors about this 
matter. The following appears from the record (R. 124): 
((THE COURT: What question, Mr. Rampton, 
haven't I asked? 
Mr. Rampton: The question of recent unpleasant-
ness in the City Commission having no connection 
with this case, if any of them have engaged in these 
citizens committee meetings or protests, and so forth? 
THE COURT: Is there any juror that didn't hear 
what Mr. Rampton said? All right, if you all heard it, is 
there any juror who has been engaged in any of the 
matters that he has indicated by his question. Does that 
satisfy you on that question? 
~1r. Rampton: Yes. 
(There was no affirmative response from any of the 
jurors in the panel)." 
After the jury retired, but before the verdict was returned, 
a man from a radio station covering the trial informed counsel 
for the defendant that the juror Jensen had been one of the 
instigators of one of the most violent protest meetings that 
occurred before the City Con1mission. Jensen, the owner of 
a bar and grill, had made complaint to the Mayor that the 
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Police Department had ''shaken him down'' by making him 
pay certain bills \vhich he did not owe before they would 
renew his beer license. These charges resulted in a hearing 
before the City Commission, in which Jensen did participate 
as a witness and as a moving party. Counsel immediately took 
the matter up with the defendant. Co1nmissioner Geurts 
informed counsel that the witness Jensen looked familiar to 
him. However, during the hearing before the City Commission, 
Jensen had sat with his back to Geurts and Geurts could not 
positively identify him, but said now that the matter was 
brought to his attention that could have been the man (R. 3 55). 
Counsel immediately contacted the city attorney, Mr. Barker, 
who had conducted the investigation before the City Com-
mission, and was informed that indeed the juror Jensen was 
the person involved in the hearing before the City Commis-
sion (R. 66). Counsel for the defendant immediately called 
this matter to the attention of the trial court (R. 3 58). The 
above facts appear by affidavit and also by evidence taken 
in support of the motion for new trial. 
This was a case in which extreme care should have been 
exercised in the selection of a jury. The case was given wide 
publicity by all media of public information. The matter had 
been discussed extensively in the community. Furthermore, 
in the weeks immediately preceding the trial, feelings in 
the community had run high, both for and against members 
of the City Commission. Even under the most favorable cir-
cumstances it would have been difficult to select a juror who 
would not have been prejudiced in this case. In view of these 
facts, the court should have exercised its discretion in removing 
from the jury any juror that had any prejudice at all, and 
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should have granted a new trial if it appeared that anything 
happened during the voir dire examination which would pre-
vent the defendant from intelligently exercising his peremp-
tory challenges. As this court stated in the case of Balle v. 
Smith, 17 P. 2d 224, at page 229, ((A litigant is entitled to a 
trial before an impartial and disinterested jury, and must be 
given reasonable opportunity to obtain such a panel." We are 
cognizant of the provisions of Rule 47 (f) ( 6) of the Rules 
of Civil Procedure, which provides: 
((No person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason 
of having formed or expressed an opinion upon the 
matter or cause to be submitted to such jury founded 
on public rumor, statements in public journals or com-
mon notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court 
that the juror can and will, notwithstanding such 
opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the matter to 
be submitted to him." 
We submit, however, that no Utah case has gone so far as 
to say a challenge for cause will not be sustained to a juror 
who has formed an opinion where such opinion is so strong 
that the juror cannot lay it aside at the beginning of the trial, 
and where it will actually take evidence to remove such an 
opinion. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that, while 
this is a civil case, the ((beyond reasonable doubt" standard 
of proof applies. How can anyone say that the juror Wilson 
could give the defendant a fair and impartial trial, when he 
went into the case with an opinion \Yhich would remain with 
him until the defendant picked up a burden of proof he should 
not bear and introduced evidence to remove such opinion? 
In the case of Stt~te r. Thorne. 41 Utah 414, this court 
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sustained a refusal of a trial judge to grant a challenge to a 
juror who said that he had forn1ed an opinion as to the guilt 
of the defendant. However, in that case the witness Cannon 
stated, to use the words of the court, nthat he could and v;ould 
lay aside and disregard his present opinion and give appellant 
a fair and impartial trial." That is far from what the witness 
Wilson said in this case. He did not say he would lay aside his 
opinion. He said that his opinion could be removed only by 
the introduction of evidence, and strong evidence at that. 
The authors of Am. fur. in Vol. 31, page 84, state: 
CCDisqualification of one to sit as a juror in a case 
does not follow from mere impression, a slight, light 
and transient opinion, a temporary, qualified or passing 
state of mind concerning the merits of the controversy 
based on mere rumor, newspaper accounts or other 
hearsay information, where it appears unequivocably 
or absolutely that he can and will, notwithstanding such 
opinion, act fairly and impartially and render a verdict 
in the case in accordance with the law and the evi-
d ,, ence. 
Such a situation did not exist here. It was not a mere impres-
sion which Wilson had. It was not a transient opinion. It was 
an opinion which he said would stay with him unless it was 
removed by evidence. This we submit was the basis for chal-
lenge. 
The situation here is very much akin to the situation 
which existed in the Oklahoma case of Morehead v. State, 
151 P. 1183, where the court held that a juror should be 
dismissed for cause where he had formed an opinion which 
it would take strong evidence to remove, even though he 
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stated he could and would, notwithstanding such optnton, 
act impartiallyand fairly and render an impartial verdict upon 
the law and the evidence. See also People v. McQuade, 110 
N.Y. 284, 18 N.E. 156. 
The purpose of voir dire examination of jurors, of course, 
is to give counsel the necessary information necessarily to exer-
cise his peremptory challenges. If fair and honest answers are 
not given to these voir dire questions, this right does not exist 
in the defendant. Section 77-38-3, U.C.A. 1953, lists as grounds 
for a new trial any misconduct of the jury by which a fair 
or due consideration of the cause may have been prevented. 
This court has held in a number of cases that failure of jurors 
to give fair and true answers on voir dire examinations con-
stitutes such misconduct. In the case of State v. Mickle, 25 
Utah 179, 70 P. 856, the court held that previously expressed 
bias of a juror, which he did not acknowledge on voir dire, 
and which was not known to the defendant or his counsel 
until after the trial, was misconduct, warranting the grantings 
of a new trial. This case is directly in point as to the juror 
Ikeda. 
In the case of State v. Thompson, 24 Utah 314, 67 P. 789, 
it was held to be misconduct warranting a new trial where 
a juror on voir dire failed to disclose that he was a stockholder 
in the corporation which owned the store which the defendant 
was accused of having burglarized. Obviously, in the Thompson 
case, had counsel for the defendant known of this connection, 
he would have exercised a peremptory challenge to the juror. 
It might reasonably be supposed that the juror would be preju-
diced. Likewise on this case, had the juror Jensen disclosed 
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his controversy with the City Commission and the Department 
of Public Safety, counsel for the defendant would have imme-
diately exercised a peremptory challenge to him because of 
the probability of bias in the case. It matters not whether 
Jensen's failure to answer resulted from a deliberate attempt 
to conceal his activities or from a lack of understanding of 
the question. The effect as to the defendant is exactly the 
same. 
We concede the existence of the rule that the question of 
granting or denying challenges to a juror and the question 
of granting or denying a motion for new trial based on the 
misconduct of jurors is a matter largely within the discretion 
of the trial court. Such discretion, however, is not unbounded. 
Whether the presence of any one of these three questionable 
jurors on the jury panel affected the outcome of the case 
cannot be known, of course. However, in view of the high 
public feeling in this case, and in further view of the tendency 
of the members of the public to regard public officials with 
suspicion, which was mentioned by the trial judge during his 
examination of the jurors (R. 98), the cumulative effect of 
these three jurors might well have been the determining factor 
in the returning of a guilty verdict as to Count 2. The court 
therefore should have exercised its discretion in favor of 
granting the motion for new trial when these facts come to 
ltght. 
POINT VIII. THE COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING 
THE DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO QUESTIONS ON 
CROSS-EXAMINATION ASKED BY THE DISTRICT AT-
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The defendant called Mr. Willard R. Smith as a character 
witness. Mr. Smith testified that Commissioner Geurts' repu-
tation for honesty and integrity in the community were very 
good. On cross-examination the district attorney asked: 
''"'V(! ould you state or would you believe that a man is honest 
and has high integrity if he uses city employees' work for 
his own gain?" (R. 284). This question was objected to by 
the defense. The court overruled the objection and of course 
Mr. Smith answered in the negative. This question was 
objectionable on two grounds-first, it assumes the truth of 
the very matter for which Commissioner Geurts was being 
tried; secondly, what Mr. Smith might think or might not 
think about Commissoiner Geurts' honesty and integrity are 
not an issue in the case. The issue in the case is the general 
reputation in the community, and this question on cross ex-
amination did not go to that question at all. The court on the 
motion for new trial when this ruling was assigned as error 
admitted that he had made an error in overruling this objec-
tion (R. 3 73). However, he held that the error was not 
prejudical. We would agree that in most circumstances 
probably an error of this type would not be of such an im-
portant nature as to affect the outcome of the trial. In a case 
such as this, however, which is replete with small and large 
errors, and where the deliberation of the jury was obviously 
balanced on a very narrow edge, any error of any nature at 
all might well have been the thing which turned the delibe-
ration. 
POINT IX. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN ARREST OF JUDGMENT 
MADE ON THE GROUNDS THAT CHAPTER 7, SECTION 
52 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
77, UTAI-I CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE HAS BEEN 
SUPERSEDED BY RULE 65(b) (1) UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
A review of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure reveals that 
a removal proceeding, rather than being handled by the Dis-
trict Attorney, should properly be handled by the Attorney 
General of the State, under the provisions of Rule 6 5 B. 
Rule 65B(b) ( 1) reads as follows, in the parts here relevant: 
c CWhere any person usurps, intrudes into, or un-
lawfully holds or exercises a public office, civil or mili-
tary, or a franchise, or an office in a corporation created 
by the authority of this state; or any public officer, civil 
or military, does or permits to be done any act which 
by the provisions of law works a forfeiture of his 
ff . '' o tee ... 
This rule was adopted and became effective with all of the 
other rules of civil procedure on January 1, 1950 (See Rule 
1 (b) ) . Rule 1 (a) states the scope of the rules in the following 
language: 
u (a) Scope of Rules: These rules shall govern the 
procedure in the Supreme Court, the district courts, 
city courts, and justice courts of the state of Utah, in 
all actions, suits and proceedings of a civil nature, 
whether cognizable at law or in equity, and in all 
special statutory proceedings, except as stated in Rule 
81. They shall be liberally construed to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." 
The exception stated in Rule 81 as to the applicability of the 
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cc (a) Special Statutory Proceedings. These rules shall 
apply to all special statutory proceedings, except in-
sofar as such rules are by their nature clearly inap-
plicable. Where a statute provides for procedure by 
reference to any part of the former Code of Civil 
Procedure, such procedure shall be in accordance with 
these rules." 
There can be no doubt but that the matter before us is a 
special statutory proceeding. The District Attorney improperly 
proceeded under 77-7-1 and 2, U.C.A. 1953, which Sections 
were adopted in 1898. The Utah Rules clearly govern the pro-
cedure in the courts of Utah ((in all suits and proceedings of 
a civil nature, whether cognizable at law or in equity, and 
in all special statutory proceedings, except as stated in Rule 
81.'' Rule 81 (a) has been quoted above; (b) refers to Probate 
and Guardianship; (c) to City and Justice Courts and (d) 
to appeals from adminisrative boards or agencies. Thus Rule 
81 (a) requires the Rules ccshall apply in all special statutory 
proceedings except insofar as such rules are by their nature 
clearly inapplicable." 
We strongly assert that the proceeding established by 
Rule 56B (b) ( 1) is not excluded by Rule 81 (a) as being 
((clearly inapplicable." The converse is true. The power is 
lodged specifically in the Attorney General under 56B( c) 
to initiate any action authorized by 65B(b) ( 1), either on 
his own initiative or at the behest of the Governor. Rule 
6 5 B (b) ( 1) is an amalgamation of former statutory Quo 
Warranto provisions found in Sections 104-66-1 and 104-66-2 
(Code 1943). 
The language of this Rule prescribes that appropriate 
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relief may be granted where n ••• any public officer, ClVll 
or military, does or permits to be done any act which by the 
provisions of lavv works a forfeiture of his office ... " This 
is exactly what the District Attorney has attempted to have 
this court declare in this special statutory proceeding. He has 
endeavored to usurp the functions of the Attorney General 
and ignore Rule 65B(b) ( 1). 
Apparently the District Attorney was in a rare quandary 
as to what procedure to follow. He could not adopt the ordinary 
criminal procedure as the Grand Jury's indictments were pend-
ing and untried. No common law crime or civil remedy was 
available under a com plaint procedure. So he has elected to 
try a special statutory proceeding enacted in 1898 and file 
an Accusation. But this procedure has been terminated and 
superseded by Rule 65B(b) ( 1), which is of the nature of 
Quo Warranto. 
Our Utah Supreme Court said that Quo Warranto is the 
correct procedure in this type case in Olsen v. Merrill, 78 Utah 
45 3, 5P2d 226. There procedures were initiated to test the 
right of certain persons to hold office as members of the 
Provo City Board of Education. The procedural question of 
whether a Writ of Prohibition or Quo Warranto is the proper 
remedy was raised, but the Court held ((a proceeding in the 
nature of Quo Warranto is the proper remedy to try title to 
a public office where it is sought to oust an incumbent from 
an office on the ground that he is not entitled to such office" 
(P. 227). 
The same basic logic applies to Rule 65B(b) ( 1) and 
such is the sole procedural method to be followed. Rule 
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6 5 B (c) , which requires the Attorney General ~lone to bring 
the action, has only one exception, and that is found in Rule 
65B( d), which permits a person claiming public office to 
file if the Attorney General has been first requested to file 
and has failed to do so. No situation of this type applies here. 
District Attorney Banks makes no pretense of coming within 
this permissive position. 
Next, let us consider the procedural aspect of the case. 
Had the matter been filed by the Attorney General under 
Rule 65B(b) ( 1) as required, there would be no question 
but that all of the rules of civil procedure would apply, includ-
ing the discovery procedures. By deposition the vague and 
unsubstantial nature of Count 1 would have been revealed 
prior to trial and the matter then would have been disposed 
of by Summary Judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Counsel submits that the ruling of the lower court should 
be reversed and that this action should be dismissed, first upon 
the ground that the statute under which it was brought is 
unconstitutional; second, on the ground that the procedural 
statute under which it is brought has been superseded. Or if 
the court rules adversely to the appellant on the above matters, 
then the case should be sent back to the lower court for a new 
trial because of the numerous and substantial errors committed 
by the trial court, as hereinbefore set forth. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CALVIN L. RAMPTON 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
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